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ABSTRACT
Quantitative definitions of what is unfair and what is fair have been
introduced in multiple disciplines for well over 50 years, including
in education, hiring, and machine learning. We trace how the no-
tion of fairness has been defined within the testing communities of
education and hiring over the past half century, exploring the cul-
tural and social context in which different fairness definitions have
emerged. In some cases, earlier definitions of fairness are similar
or identical to definitions of fairness in current machine learning
research, and foreshadow current formal work. In other cases, in-
sights into what fairness means and how to measure it have largely
gone overlooked. We compare past and current notions of fairness
along several dimensions, including the fairness criteria, the focus
of the criteria (e.g., a test, a model, or its use), the relationship of fair-
ness to individuals, groups, and subgroups, and the mathematical
method for measuring fairness (e.g., classification, regression). This
work points the way towards future research and measurement of
(un)fairness that builds from our modern understanding of fairness
while incorporating insights from the past.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 effectively outlawed
discrimination on the basis of of an individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The Act contained two important provisions
that would fundamentally shape the public’s understanding of what
it meant to be unfair, with lasting impact into modern day: Title VI,
which prevented government agencies that receive federal funds
(including universities) from discriminating on the basis of race,
color or national origin; and Title VII, which prevented employers
with 15 or more employees from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
Assessment tests used in public and private industry immedi-
ately came under public scrutiny. The question posed by many
at the time was whether the tests used to assess ability and fit in
education and employment were discriminating on bases forbidden
by the new law [2]. This stimulated a wealth of research into how
to mathematically measure unfair bias and discrimination within
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the educational and employment testing communities, often with a
focus on race. The period of time from 1966 to 1976 in particular
gave rise to fairness research with striking parallels to ML fair-
ness research from 2011 until today, including formal notions of
fairness based on population subgroups, the realization that some
fairness criteria are incompatible with one another, and pushback
on quantitative definitions of fairness due to their limitations.
Into the 1970s, there was a shift in perspective, with researchers
moving from defining how a test may be unfair to how a test may
be fair. It is during this time that we see the introduction of mathe-
matical criteria for fairness identical to the mathematical criteria
of modern day. Unfortunately, this fairness movement largely dis-
appeared by the end of the 1970s, as the different and sometimes
competing notions of fairness left little room for clarity on when
one notion of fairness may be preferable to another. Following
the retrospective analysis of Nancy Cole [15], who introduced the
equivalent of Hardt et al.’s 2016 equality of opportunity [32] in 1973:
The spurt of research on fairness issues that began in the
late 1960s had results that were ultimately disappointing.
No generally agreed uponmethod to determine whether
or not a test is fair was developed. No statistic that could
unambiguously indicate whether or not an item is fair
was identified. There were no broad technical solutions
to the issues involved in fairness.
By learning from this past, we hope to avoid such a fate.
Before further diving in to the history of testing fairness, it is
useful to briefly consider the structural correspondences between
tests and ML models. Test items (questions) are analogous to model
features, and item responses analogous to specific activations of
those features. Scoring a test is typically a simple linearmodel which
produces a (possibly weighted) sum of the item scores. Sometimes
test scores are normalized or standardized so that scores fit a desired
range or distribution. Because of this correspondence, much of the
math is directly comparable; and many of the underlying ideas in
earlier fairness work trivially map on to modern day ML fairness.
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes”; and by hearing
this rhyme, we hope to gain insight into the future of ML fairness.
Following terminology of the social sciences, applied statistics,
and the notation of [4], we use “demographic variable” to refer
to an attribute of individuals such as race, age or gender, denoted
by the symbol A. We use “subgroup” to denote a group of indi-
viduals defined by a shared value of a demographic variable, e.g.,
A = a. Y indicates the ground truth or target variable, R denotes a
score output by a model or a test, and D denotes a binary decision
made using that score. We occasionally make exceptions when
referencing original material.
2 HISTORY OF FAIRNESS IN TESTING
2.1 1960s: Bias and Unfair Discrimination
Concerned with the fairness of tests for black and white students,
T. Anne Cleary defined a quantitative measure of test bias for the
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(a) Labels on regression lines indicate which subgroup they fit. (b) The regression line labeled πc fits both subgroups separately (and
hence also their union).
Figure 1: Petersen and Novick’s [52] original figures demonstrating fairness criteria. The marginal distributions of test scores
and ground truth scores for subgroups π1 and π2 are shown by the axes.
first time, cast in terms of a formal model for predicting educational
outcomes from test scores [10, 11]:
A test is biased for members of a subgroup of the popula-
tion if, in the prediction of a criterion for which the test
was designed, consistent nonzero errors of prediction
are made for members of the subgroup. In other words,
the test is biased if the criterion score predicted from the
common regression line is consistently too high or too
low for members of the subgroup. With this definition
of bias, there may be a connotation of “unfair," particu-
larly if the use of the test produces a prediction that is
too low. (Emphasis added.)
According to Cleary’s criterion, the situation depicted in Fig-
ure 1a is biased for members of subgroup π2 if the regression line
π1 is used to predict their ability, since it underpredicts their true
ability. For Cleary, the situation depicted in Figure 1b is not biased:
since data from each of the subgroups produce the same regression
line, that line can be used to make predictions for either group.
In addition to defining bias in terms of predictions by regression
models, Cleary also performed a study on real-world data from three
state-supported and state-subsidized schools, comparing college
GPA with SAT scores. Racial data was obtained from an admissions
office, from an NAACP list of black students, and from examining
class pictures. Cleary used Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) to
test the relationships between SAT andHSR scores with GPA grades.
Contrary to some expectations, Cleary found little evidence of the
SAT being a biased predictor of GPA. (Later, larger studies found
that the SAT overpredicted the GPA of black students [64]; it may
be that the SAT is biased but less so than the GPA.)
While Cleary’s focus was on education, her contemporary Robert
Guion was concerned with unfair discrimination in employment.
Arguing for the importance of quantitative analyses in 1966, he
wrote that: “Illegal discrimination is largely an ethical matter, but
the fulfillment of ethical responsibility begins with technical compe-
tence” [30], and defined unfair discrimination to be “when persons
with equal probabilities of success on the job have unequal proba-
bilities of being hired for the job.” However, Guion recognized the
challenges in using constructs such as the probability of success.
We can observe actual success and failure after selection, but the
probability of success is not itself observable, and a sophisticated
model is required to estimate it at the time of selection.
By the end of the 1960s, there was political and legal support
backing concerns with the unfairness of the educational system for
black children and the unfairness of tests purporting to measure
black intellectual competence. Responding to these concerns, the
Association of Black Psychologists formed in 1969 immediately
published “A Petition of Concerns”, calling for a moratorium on
standardized tests “(which are used) to maintain and justify the
practice of systematically denying economic opportunities” [66].
The NAACP followed up on this in 1974 by adopting a resolution
that demanded “a moratorium on standardized testing wherever
such tests have not been corrected for cultural bias” (cited by [56]).
Meanwhile, advocates of testing worried that alternatives to testing
such as interviews would introduce more subjective bias [26].1
2.2 1970s: Fairness
As the 1960s turned to the 1970s, work began to arise that parallels
the recent evolution of work in ML fairness, marking a change
in framing from unfairness to fairness. Following Thorndike [62],
“The discussion of ‘fairness’ in what has gone before is clearly over-
simplified. In particular, it has been based upon the premise that
the available criterion score is a perfectly relevant, reliable and
unbiased measure...” Thorndike’s sentiment was shared by other
academics of the time, who, in examining the earlier work of Cleary,
objected that it failed to take into account the differing false positive
and false negative rates that occur when subgroups have different
base rates (i.e., A is not independent of Y ) [24, 62].
With the goal of moving beyond simplified models, Thorndike
[62] proposed one of the first quantitative criteria for measuring
test fairness. With this shift, Thorndike advocated for considering
the contextual use of a test:
A judgment on test-fairness must rest on the inferences
that are made from the test rather than on a comparison
of mean scores in the two populations. One must then
focus attention on fair use of the test scores, rather than
on the scores themselves.
1 For example, the origins of the college entrance essay are rooted in ivy league
universities’ covert attempts to suppress the numbers of Jewish students, whose
performance on entrance exams had led them to become an increasing percentage of
the student population [38].
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Contrary to Cleary, Thorndike argued that sharing a common
regression line is not important, as one can achieve fair selection
goals by using different regression lines and different selection
thresholds for the two groups.
As an alternative to Cleary, Thorndike proposed that the ratio
of predicted positives to ground truth positives be equal for each
group. Using confusion matrix terminology, this is equivalent to
requiring that the ratio (TP + FP)/(TP + FN ) be equal for each
subgroup. According to Thorndike, the situation in Figure 1a is fair
for test cutoff x∗. Figure 1b is unfair using any single threshold, but
fair if threshold x∗1 is used for group π1 and threshold x
∗
2 is used
for group π2.
Similar tomodern dayML fairness, e.g., Friedler et al. in 2016 [28],
Thorndike also pointed out the tension between individual notions
of fairness and group notions of fairness: “the two definitions of
fairness—one based on predicted criterion score for individuals and
the other on the distribution of criterion scores in the two groups—
will always be in conflict.” The conflict was also raised by others in
the period, including Sawyer et al. [57], in a foreshadowing of the
compas debate of 2016:
A conflict arises because the success maximization pro-
cedures based on individual parity do not produce equal
opportunity (equal selection for equal success) based on
group parity and the opportunity procedures do not pro-
duce success maximization (equal treatment for equal
prediction) based on individual parity.
Almost as an aside, Thorndike mentions the existence of another
regression line ignored by Cleary: the line that estimates the value
of the test score R given the target variable Y . This idea hints at the
notion of equal opportunity for those with a given value of Y , an
idea which soon was picked up by Darlington [19] and Cole [14].
At a glance, Cleary’s and Thorndike’s definitions are difficult to
compare directly because of the different ways in which they’re
defined. Darlington [19] helped to shed light on the relationship
between Cleary and Thorndike’s conceptions of fairness by express-
ing them in a common formalism. He defines four fairness criteria
in terms of the correlation ρAR between the demographic variable
and the test score. Following Darlington,
(1) Cleary’s criterion can be restated in terms of correlations of
the “culture variable” with test scores. If Cleary’s criterion
holds for every subgroup, then ρAR = ρAY /ρRY [63]. 2
(2) Similarly, Thorndike’s criterion is equivalent to requiring
that ρAR = ρAY .
(3) The criterion ρAR = ρAY × ρRY is motivated by thinking
about R as a dependent variable affected by independent
variables A and Y . If A has no direct effect on R once Y is
taken into account then we have a zero partial correlation,
i.e. ρAR .Y = 0.3.
(4) An alternative “starkly simple” criterion of ρAR = 0 (rec-
ognizable as modern day demographic parity [23]) is intro-
duced but not dwelt on.
Darlington’s mapping of Cleary’s and Thorndike’s criteria lets
him prove that they’re incompatible except in the special cases
2Although Darlington does not mention this additional constraint, we believe the
criterion only holds if A, R and Y have a multivariate normal distribution.
3See footnote 2
Figure 2: Darlington’s original graph of fair values of the
correlation between culture and test score (rCX in Darling-
ton’s notation), plotted against the correlation between test
score and ground truth (rXY ), according to his definitions
(1–4). (The correlation between the demographic and target
variables is assumed here to be fixed at 0.2.)
where the test perfectly predicts the target variable (ρRY = 1), or
where the target variable is uncorrelated with the demographic vari-
able (ρAY = 0). Figure 2, reproduced from Darlington’s 1971 work,
shows that, for any given non-zero correlation between the demo-
graphic and target variables, definitions (1), (2), and (3) converge
as the correlation between the test score and the target variable
approach 1. When the test has only a poor correlation with the
target variable, there may be no fair solution using definition (1).
Figure 2 enables a range of further observations. According to
definition (1), for a given correlation between demographic and
target variables, the lower the correlation of the test with the target
variable, the higher it is allowed to correlate with the demographic
variable and still be considered fair. Definition (3), on the other hand,
is the opposite, in that the lower the correlation of the test with
the target variable, the lower too must be the the test’s correlation
with the demographic variable. Darlington’s criterion (2) is the
geometric mean of criteria (1) and (3): “a compromise position
midway between [the] two... however, a compromise may end up
satisfying nobody; psychometricians are not in the habit of agreeing
on important definitions or theorems by compromise.” Darlington
shows that definition (3) is the only one of the four whose errors
are uncorrelated with the demographic variable, where by “errors”,
he means errors in the regression task of estimating Y from R.
In 1973, Cole [14] continued exploring ideas of equal outcomes
across subgroups, defining fairness as all subgroups having the same
True Positive Rate (TPR), recognizable as modern day equality of
opportunity [32]. That same year, Linn [43] introduced (but did not
advocate for) equal Positive Predictive Value (PPV) as a fairness
criterion, recognizable as modern day predictive parity [9].4
Under Cleary and Darlington’s conceptions, bias or (un)fairness
is a property of the test itself. This is contrary to Thorndike, Linn
and Cole, who take fairness to be a property of the use of a test.
The latter group tended to assume that a test is static, and focused
on optimizing its use; whereas Cleary’s concerns were with how
to improve the tests themselves. Cleary worked for Educational
4Although he cites [30] and [24], a seeming misattribution, as pointed out by [52].
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Category Description
individual Fairness criterion defined purely in
terms of individuals
non-comparative Fairness criterion for each subgroup
does not reference other subgroups
subgroup parity Fairness criterion defined in terms of
parity of some value across subgroups
correlation Fairness criterion defined in terms of
the correlation of the demographic vari-
able with the model output
Table 1: Categories of Fairness Criteria
Testing Services, and one can imagine a test being designed allowing
for a range of use cases, since it may not be knowable in advance
either i) the precise populations on which it will be deployed, nor
ii) the number of students which an institution deploying the test
is able to offer places to.
By March 1976, the interest in fairness in the educational testing
community was so strong that an entire issue of the Journal of
Education Measurement was devoted to the topic [47], including
a lengthy lead article by Peterson and Novick [52], in which they
consider for the first time the equality of True Negative Rates (TNR)
across subgroups, and equal TPR / equal TNR across subgroups
(modern day equalized odds [32]). Similarly, they consider the case
of equal PPV and equal NPV across subgroups.5
Work from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s can be summarized along
four distinct categories: individual, non-comparative, subgroup
parity, and correlation, defined in Table 1. It should be empha-
sized that in not all cases where a researcher defined a criterion did
they also advocate for it. In particular, Darlington, Linn, Jones, and
Peterson and Novick all define criteria purely for the purposes of
exploring the space of concepts related to fairness. A summary of
fairness technical definitions during this time is listed in Table 2.
2.3 Mid-1970s: The Fairness Tide Turns
Immediately after the the journal issue of 1976, research into quan-
titative definitions of test fairness seems to have come to a halt.
Considering why this happened may be a valuable lesson to learn
from for modern day fairness research. The same Cole who in 1973
proposed equality of TPR, wrote in 2001 that [15]:
In short, research over the last 30 or so years has not
supplied any analyses to unequivocally indicate fairness
or unfairness, nor has it produced clear procedures to
avoid unfairness. To make matters worse, the views of
fairness of the measurement profession and the views of
the general public are often at odds.
Foreshadowing this outcome, statements from researchers in
the 1970s indicate an increasing concern with how fairness cri-
teria obscure “the fundamental problem, which is to find some
rational basis for providing compensatory treatment for the dis-
advantaged” [48]. Following Peterson and Novick, the concepts of
5 They do not advocate for either combination (neither equal TPR and TNR, nor equal
PPV and NPV) on the grounds that either combination requires unusual circumstances.
However there is a flaw in their reasoning. For example, arguing against equal TPR
and equal TNR, they claim that this requires equal base rates in the ground truth in
addition to equal TPR.
culture-fairness and group parity are not viable in practice, leading
to models that can sanction the discrimination they seek to rectify
[52]. They argue that fairness should be reconceptualized as a prob-
lem in maximizing expected utility [51], recognizing “high social
utility in equalizing opportunity and reducing disadvantage” [48].
A related thread of work highlights that different fairness cri-
teria encode different value systems [34], and that quantitative
techniques alone cannot answer the question of which to use. In
1971, Darlington [19] urges that the concept of “cultural fairness”
be replaced by “cultural optimality”, which takes into account a
policy-level question concerning the optimum balance between
accuracy and cultural factors. In 1974, Thorndike points out that
“one’s value system is deeply involved in one’s judgment as to what
is ‘fair use’ of a selection device” [48]), and similarly, in 1976, Linn
[44] draws attention to the fact that “Values are implicit in the mod-
els. To adequately address issues of values they need to be dealt
with explicitly.” Hunter and Schmidt [34] begin to address this issue
by bringing ethical theory to the discussion, relating fairness to
theories of individualism and proportional representation. Current
work may learn from this point in history by explicitly connecting
fairness criteria to different cultural and social values.
2.4 1970s on: Differential Item Functioning
Concurrent with the development of criteria for the fair use of tests,
another line of research in the measurement community concerned
looking for bias in test questions (“items”). In 1968, Cleary and
Hilton [12] used an analysis of variance (ANOVA) design to test
the interaction between race, socioeconomic level and test item.
Ten years later, the related idea of Differential Item Functioning
(DIF) was introduced by Scheuneman in 1979 [58]: “an item is
considered unbiased if, for persons with the same ability in the
area being measured, the probability of a correct response on the
item is the same regardless of the population group membership
of the individual.” That is, if I = I (q) is the variable representing a
correct response on question q, then by this definition I is unbiased
if A ⊥ I |Y .
In practice, the best measure of the ability that the item is testing
is often the test in which the item is a component [21]:
Amajor change from focusing primarily on fairness in a
domain, where so many factors could spoil the validity
effort, to a domainwhere analyses could be conducted in
a relatively simple, less confounded way. ... In a DIF anal-
ysis, the item is evaluated against something designed to
measure a particular construct and something that the
test producer controls, namely a test score.
Figure 3 illustrates DIF for a test item.
DIF became very influential in the education field, and to this day
DIF is in the toolbox of test designers. Items displaying a DIF are
ideally examined further to identify the cause of bias, and possibly
removed from the test [50].
2.5 1980s and beyond
With the start of the 1980s came renewed public debate about the
existence of racial differences in general intelligence, and the impli-
cations for fair testing, following the publication of the controversial
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Source Criterion Category Proposition
Guion (1966)
“people with equal probabilities of success on the job
have equal probabilities of being hired for the job” individual Is the use of the test fair?
Cleary (1966) “a subgroup does not have consistent errors” non-comparative Is the test fair to subgroup a?
Einhorn and Bass (1971)†
Prob(Y > y ∗ |R = ra∗,A = a) is constant for all
subgroups a subgroup parity
Is the use of the test fair
with respect to A?
Thorndike (1971)
Prob(R >= ra ∗ |A = a)/Prob(Y >= y ∗ |A = a) is
constant for all subgroups a subgroup parity
Is the use of the test fair
with respect to A?
Darlington (1971) (1) ρAX = ρAY /ρRY (equivalent to ρAY .R = 0)
correlation Is the test fair with respect to A?
Darlington (1971) (2) ρAR = ρAY
Darlington (1971) (3) ρAR = ρAY × ρRY (equivalent to ρAR .Y = 0)
Darlington (1971) (4) ρAR = 0
Darlington (1971) ρR(Y−kA), is maximized where k is the subjective
value placed on subgroup attribute A = 1 correlation
Does the test produce the
culturally optimum† optimal outcome w.r.t. A?
Cole (1973)
Prob(R >= ra ∗ |Y >= y∗,A = a) is constant for all
subgroups a subgroup parity
Is the use of the test fair
with respect to A?
Linn (1973)
Prob(Y >= y ∗ |R >= ra∗,A = a) is constant for all
subgroups a subgroup parity
Is the use of the test fair
with respect to A?
Jones (1973)
E(Yˆ |a) = E(Y |a) non-comparative Is the test fair to subgroup a?
mean fair†
Jones (1973) a subgroup a has equal representation in the
top-n candidates ranked by model score as it has
in the top-n candidates ranked by Y , for all n
non-comparative Is the test fair to subgroup a?general standard†
Jones (1973) a subgroup a has equal representation in the
top-n candidates ranked by model score as it has
in the top-n candidates ranked by Y
non-comparative
Is the use of the test fair to
subgroup a?at position n
†
Peterson & Novick (1976) Prob(R >= ra ∗ |Y >= y∗,A = a) is constant for all
subgroups a, and Prob(R < ra ∗ |Y < y∗,A = a) is
constant for all subgroups a
subgroup parity Is the use of the test fairwith respect to A?conditional probability and
its converse
Peterson & Novick (1976) Prob(Y >= y ∗ |R >= ra∗,A = a) is constant for all
subgroups a, and Prob(Y < y ∗ |R < ra∗,A = a) is
constant for all subgroups a
subgroup parity Is the use of the test fairwith respect to A?equal probability and its
converse
Table 2: Early technical definitions of fairness in educational and employment testing. Variables: R is the test score; Y is the
target variable; A is the demographic variable. The Proposition column indicates whether fairness is considered a property of
the way in which a test is used, or of the test itself. † indicates that the criterion is discussed in the appendix.
Bias in Mental Testing [36]. Political opponents of group-based con-
siderations in educational and employment practices framed them
in terms of “preferential treatment” for minorities and “reverse dis-
crimination” against whites. Despite, or perhaps because of, much
public debate, neither Congress nor the courts gave unambiguous
answers to the question of how to balance social justice consid-
erations with the historical and legal importance placed on the
individual in the United States [18].
Into the 1980s, courts were asked to rule on many cases involv-
ing (un)fairness in educational testing. To give just one example,
Zwick and Dorans [71] described the case of Debra P. v. Turlington
1984, in which a lawsuit was filed on behalf of “present and future
twelfth grade students who had failed or would fail” a high school
graduation test. The initial ruling found that the test perpetuated
past discrimination and was in violation of the Civil Rights Act.
More examples of court rulings on fairness are given by [53, 71].
By the early 1980s, ideas about fairness were having awidespread
influence on U.S. employment practices. In 1981, with no public
debate, the United States Employment Services implemented score-
adjustment strategy that was sometimes called “race-norming” [54].
Each individual is assigned a percentile ranking within their own
ethnic group, rather than to the test-taking population. By the mid-
1980s, race-norming was “a highly controversial issue sparking
heated debate.” The debate was settled through legislation, with the
1991 Civil Rights Act banning the practice of race-norming [65].
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Figure 3: Original graph from [22] illustrating DIF.
3 CONNECTIONS TO ML FAIRNESS
3.1 Equivalent Notions
Many of the fairness criteria we have overviewed are identical to
modern-day fairness definitions. Here is a brief summary of these
connections:
• Peterson and Novick’s “conditional probability and its con-
verse” is equivalent to what in ML fairness is variously called
sufficiency [4], equalized odds [32], or conditional procedure
accuracy [5], sometimes expressed as the conditional inde-
pendence A ⊥ D |Y .
• Similarly, their “equal probability and its converse” is equiv-
alent to what is called sufficiency [4] or conditional use accu-
racy equality [5], A ⊥ Y |D.
• Cole’s 1973 fairness definition is identical to equality of op-
portunity [32], A ⊥ D |Y = 1.
• Linn’s 1973 definition is equivalent to predictive parity [9],
A ⊥ Y |D = 1.
• Darlington’s criterion (1) is equivalent to sufficiency in the
special case where A, R and Y have a multivariate Gaussian
distribution. This is because for this special case the partial
correlation ρAY .X = 0 is equivalent to A ⊥ Y |R [3]. In gen-
eral though, we cannot assume even a one way implication,
since A ⊥ Y |R does not imply ρAY .X = 0 (see [63] for a
counterexample).
• Similarly, Darlington’s criteria (2) and (3) are equivalent to
independence and separation only in the special cases of
multivariate Gaussian distributions.
• Darlington’s definition (4) is a relaxation of what is called
independence [4] or demographic parity in ML fairness, i.e.
A ⊥ R; it is equivalent when A and R have a bivariate Gauss-
ian distribution.
• Guion’s definition “people with equal probabilities of success
on the job have equal probabilities of being hired for the job”
is a special case of Dwork’s [23] individual fairness with the
presupposition that “probability of success on the job” is a
construct that can be meaningfully reasoned about.
The fairness literature in both the fields of ML and in testing have
also been motivated by causal considerations [32, 41]. Darlington
[19] motivate his definition (3) on the basis of a causal relation-
ship between Y and R (since an ability being measured affects the
performance on the test). However [34] have pointed out that in
testing scenarios we typically only have a proxy for ability, such as
later GPA 4 years later, and it is wrong to draw a causal connection
from GPA to college entrance exam.
Hardt et al. [32] describe the challenge in building causal mod-
els, by considering two distinct models and their consequences
and concluding that “no test based only on the target labels, the
protected attribute and the score would give different indications
for the optimal score R∗ in the two scenarios.” This is remarkably
reminiscent of Anastasi [1], writing in 1961 about test fairness:
No test can eliminate causality. Nor can a test score, how-
ever derived, reveal the origin of the behavior it reflects.
If certain environmental factors influence behavior, they
will also influence those samples of behavior covered by
tests.Whenwe use tests to compare different groups, the
only question the tests can answer directly is: “How do
these groups differ under existing cultural conditions?”
Both the testing fairness and ML fairness literatures have also
paid great attention to impossibility results, such as the distinction
between group fairness and individual fairness, and the impossi-
bility of obtaining more than one of separation, sufficiency and
independence except under special conditions [4, 9, 19, 40, 52, 62].
In addition, we see some striking parallels in the framing of
fairness in terms of ethical theories, including explicit advocacy for
utilitarian approaches.
• Petersen and Novick’s utility-based approaches relate to
Corbett-Davies et al.’s framing of the cost of fairness [17].
• Hunter and Schmidt’s analysis of the value systems under-
lying fairness criteria is similar in spirit to Friedler et al.’s
relation of fairness criteria and different worldviews [28].
3.2 Variable Independence
As briefly mentioned above, modern day ML fairness has catego-
rized fairness definitions in terms of independence of variables,
which includes sufficiency and separation [4]. Some historical no-
tions of fairness neatly fit into this categorization, but others shed
light on further dimensions of fairness criteria. Table 3 summarizes
these connections, linking the historical criteria introduced in Sec-
tion 2 to modern day categories. (Utility-based criteria are omitted,
but will be discussed below.)
We find that non-comparative criteria (discussed by Cleary and
Jones) do not map onto any of the independence conditions used
in ML fairness. Similarly, Thorndike’s, and Darlington’s have no
counterparts that we know of. There are conceptual similarities
between Jones’ criteria and the constrained ranking problem de-
scribed by [8], and also between Einhorn’s criterion and concerns
about infra-marginality [60].
For a binary classifier, Thorndike’s 1971 group parity criterion
is equivalent to requiring that the ratio of positive predictions to
ground truth positives be equal for all subgroups. This ratio has no
common name that we could find (unlike e.g., precision, recall, etc.),
although [52] refer to this as the “Constant RatioModel”. It is closely
related to coverage constraints [29], class mass normalization [70]
and expectation regularization [45]. Similar arguments can be made
for Darlington’s criterion (2) and Jones’ criteria “at position n” and
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Historical criterion ML fairness criterion Relationship
Guion (1966) individual relaxation
Cleary (1968) sufficiency when Cleary’s criterion holds for all subgroups then we we have equivalencewhen R and Y have bivariate Gaussian distribution
Einhorn and Bass (1971) sufficiency both involve probability of Y conditioned on R , but Einhorn and Bass areonly concerned with the conditional likelihood at the decision threshold
Thorndike (1971) — —
Darlington (1971) (1) sufficiency equivalent when variables have a multivariate Gaussian distribution
Darlington (1971) (2) — —
Darlington (1971) (3) separation equivalent when variables have a multivariate Gaussian distribution
Darlington (1971) (4) independence equivalent when variables have a bivariate Gaussian distribution
Cole (1973) separation relaxation (equivalent to equality of opportunity)
Linn (1973) sufficiency relaxation (equivalent to predictive parity)
Jones (1973) mean fair — —
Jones (1973) at position n — —
Jones (1973) general criterion — —
Peterson and Novick (1976) separation equivalent
conditional probability and its converse
Peterson and Novick (1976) sufficiency equivalent
equal probability and its converse
Table 3: Relationships between testing criteria and ML’s independence criteria
“general criterion”.When viewed as amodel of subgroup quotas [34],
Thorndike’s criterion is reminiscent of fair division in economics.
3.3 Regression and Correlation
In reviewing the history of fairness in testing, it becomes clear that
regression models have played a much larger role than in the ML
community. Similarly, the use of correlation as a fairness criterion
is all but absent in modern ML Fairness literature.
Given that correlation of two variables is a weaker criterion
than independence, it is reasonable to ask why one might want a
fairness criterion defined in terms of correlations. One practical
reason is that calculating correlations is a lot easier than estimating
independence. Whereas correlation is a descriptive statistic, and
so calculating requires few assumptions, estimating independence
requires an the use of inferential statistics, which can in general be
highly non-trivial [59].
Considering the analogy between model features and test items
described in the Introduction, we also know of no ML analogs to
the Differential Item Functioning. Such analogs might test for bias
in model features. Instead, one approach adopted in ML fairness
has been the use of adversarial methods to mitigate the effects of
features with undesirable correlations with subgroups, e.g., [6, 69].
3.4 Model vs. Model Use
Section 2 described how the test literature had competing notions
of whether fairness is a property of a test, or of the use of a test.
A similar discussion of whether ML models can be judged as fair
or unfair independent of a specific use (including a specific model
threshold) has been largely implicit or missing in the ML fairness
literature. Models are sometimes trained to be “fair” at their default
decision threshold (e.g., 0.5), although the use of different thresholds
can have a major impact on fairness [32]. The ML fairness notion
of calibration, i.e., P(Y = 1|A = a,R = r ) = r for all a and r , can
be interpreted to be a property of the model rather than of its use,
since it does not depend on the choice of decision threshold.
3.5 Race and Gender
Some work on practically assessing fairness in ML has tackled
the problem of using race as a construct. This echoes concerns in
the testing literature that stem back to at least 1966: “one stum-
bles immediately over the scientific difficulty of establishing clear
yardsticks by which people can be classified into convenient racial
categories” [30]. Recent approaches have used Fitzpatrick skin type
or unsupervised clustering to avoid racial categorizations [7, 55].
We note that the testing literature of the 1960s and 1970s frequently
uses the phrase “cultural fairness” when referring to parity between
blacks and whites. Other than Thomas [61], the test fairness lit-
erature of the 1960s and 1970s was typically concerned with race
rather than gender (although received attention later, e.g., [67]). The
role of culture in gender identity and gender presentation has seen
less consideration in ML fairness, but gender labels raise ethical
concerns [31, 33].
Comparable to modern sentiment in the difficulties of measur-
ing fairness, earlier decisions in the courtroom highlighted the
impossibility of properly accounting for all factors that influence in-
equalities. For example, in 1964, Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission (FEPC) examiner found that Motorola had discrimi-
nated against Leon Myart, a black American, in his application to
work at Motorola as an “analyzer and phaser”. The examiner found
that the 5 minute screening test that Myart took did not account
for inequalities and environmental factors of culturally deprived
groups. The case was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which
found that Myart actually passed the test, and so declined to rule
on the fairness of the test [2].
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4 FAIRNESS GAPS
4.1 Fairness and Unfairness
In mapping out earlier fairness approaches and their relationship
to ML fairness, some conceptual gaps emerge. One noticeable gap
relates to the difference in framing between fairness and unfairness.
In earlier work on test fairness, there was a focus on defining mea-
surements in terms of unfair discrimination and unfair bias, which
brought with it the problem of uncovering sources of bias [12]. In
the 1970s, this developed into framings in terms of fairness, and the
introduction of fairness criteria similar or identical to ML fairness
criteria known today. However, returning to the idea of unfairness
suggests several new areas of inquiry, including quantifying dif-
ferent kinds of unfairness and bias (such as content bias, selection
system bias, etc., cf. [35]), and a shift in focus from outcomes to
inputs and processes [13]. Quantifying types of unfairness may not
only add to the problems that machine learning can address, but
also accords with realities of sentencing and policing behind much
of the fairness research today: Individuals seeking justice do so
when they believe that something has been unfair.
4.2 Differential Item Functioning
Another gap that becomes clear from the historical perspective
is the lack of an analog to Differential Item Functioning (Section
2.4) in current ML fairness research. DIF was used by education
professionals as a motivation for investigating causes of bias, and a
modern-day analog might include unfairness interpretability in ML
models. An direct analog inML could be to compare P(Xi |R = r ,A =
a) for different input features Xi , model outputs R and subgroupsA.
For example, when predicting loan repayment, this might involve
comparing how income levels differ across subgroups for a given
predicted likelihood of repaying the loan.
4.3 Target Variable / Model Score Relationship
Another gap is the ways in which the model (test) score and the tar-
get variable are related to each other. In many cases in ML fairness
and test fairness, there are correspondences between pairs of criteria
which differ only in the roles played by the model (test) score R and
the target variable Y . That is, one criterion can be transformed into
another by swapping the symbols R and Y ; for example, separation
can be transformed into sufficiency: A ⊥ R |Y −→ A ⊥ Y |R. In this
section we will refer to this type of correspondence as “converse”,
i.e., separation is the converse of sufficiency.
When viewed in this light, some asymmetries stand out:
• Converse Cleary criterion: Cleary’s criterion considers the
case of a regression model that predicts a target variable
Y given test score R. One could also consider the converse
regression model (mentioned in passing by [62]), which pre-
dicts model score R from ground truth Y , as an instrument
for detecting bias.6 The converse Cleary condition would
say that a test has connotations of unfair for a subgroup if
the converse regression line has positive errors, i.e., for each
given level of ground truth ability, the test score is higher
than the converse regression line predicts.
6The Cleary regression model and its converse are distinct except in the special case
where the magnitudes of the variables have been standardized.
• Converse calibration: In a regression scenario, the calibration
condition P(Y = 1|R = r ,A = a) = r can be rewritten as
E(Y |R = r ,A = a) = r , or E(Y − r |R = r ,A = a) = 0.
The converse calibration condition is therefore E(R − y |Y =
y,A = a) = 0 for all subgroups A = a. In other words, for
each subgroup and level of ground truth performance Y = y,
the expected error in R’s prediction of the value y is zero.
We point out these overlooked concepts not to advocate for their
use, but to map out the geography of concepts related to fairness
more completely.
4.4 Compromises
Darlington [19] points out that Thorndike’s criterion is a compro-
mise between one criterion related to sufficiency and one related to
separation (see Section 2.2 and Tables 2 and 3). In general, a space
of compromises is possible; in terms of correlations, this might be
modeled using a parameter λ:
ρAR = ρAY .ρ
λ
RY (1)
where λ values of -1, 0, and 1 imply Darlington’s definitions (1), (2)
and (3), respectively.
This also suggests exploring interpolations between the contrast-
ing sufficiency and separation criteria. For example, one way of
parameterizing their interpolation is in terms of binary confusion
matrix outcomes.
Definition 4.1. (λ1, λ2)-Thorndikian fairness: A binary classifier
satisfies (λ1, λ2)-Thorndikian fairness with respect to demographic
variable A if both
a) TP + λ1FP
TP + λ2FN
is constant for all values of A , and
b) TN + λ1FN
TN + λ2FP
is constant for all values of A.
Note that (1, 0)-Thorndikian fairness is equivalent to sufficiency,
while (0, 1)-Thorndikian fairness is equivalent to separation.
Petersen and Novick [52] showed that (1, 1)-Thorndikian fairness
requires that either a) for each subgroup, the positive class is pre-
dicted in proportion to its ground truth rate; or b) every subgroup
has the same ground truth rate of positives. We can also consider
relaxations of (λ1, λ2)-Thorndikian fairness in which only one of the
two conditions (a) or (b) is required to hold. For example, only re-
quiring condition (a) gives us a way of parameterizing compromises
between equality of opportunity and predictive parity.
Our goal here is not to advocate for this particular model of
compromise between separation and sufficiency. Rather, since sep-
aration and sufficiency criteria can encode competing interests of
different parties, our goal is to suggest that ML fairness consider
how to encode notions of compromise, which in some scenarios
might relate to the public’s notion of fairness. We propose that the
economics literature on fair division might provide some useful
ideas, as has also been suggested by [68]. However, we do heed
Darlington’s [19] warning that “a compromise may end up satisfy-
ing nobody; psychometricians are not in the habit of agreeing on
important definitions or theorems by compromise.” This statement
may be equally true of ML practitioners.
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5 DISCUSSION
This short review of historical connections in fairness suggest sev-
eral concrete steps forward for future research in ML fairness:
(1) Developing methods to explain and reduce model unfairness
by focusing on the causes of unfairness. To paraphrase Dar-
lington’s [19] question: “What can be said about models that
discriminate among cultures at various levels?” yields more
actionable insights than “What is a fair model?” This is re-
lated to research on causality in ML Fairness (see Section
3.1), but including examination of full causal pathways, and
processes that interact well before decision time. In other
words: What causes the disparities?
(2) Drawing from earlier insights of Guion [30], Thorndike [62],
Cole [14], Linn [43], Jones [37], and Peterson & Novick [52]
to expand fairness criteria to include model context and use.
(3) Building from earlier insights of 1970s researchers [19, 34, 44]
to incorporate quantitative factors for the balance between
fairness goals and other goals, such as a value system or a
system of ethics. This will likely include clearly articulating
assumptions and choices, as recently proposed in [46].
(4) Diving more deeply into the question of how subgroups are
defined, suggested as early as 1966 [30], including question-
ing whether subgroups should be treated as discrete cate-
gories at all, and how intersectionality can be modeled. This
might include, for example, how to quantify fairness along
one dimension (e.g., age) conditioned on another dimension
(e.g., skin tone), as recent work has begun to address [27, 39].
6 CONCLUSIONS
The spike in interest in test fairness in the 1960s arose during a
time of social and political upheaval, with quantitative definitions
catalyzed in part by U.S. federal anti-discrimination legislation in
the domains of education and employment. The rise of interest
in fairness today has corresponded with public interest in the use
of machine learning in criminal sentencing and predictive polic-
ing, including discussions around compas [16, 20, 42] and PredPol
[25, 49]. Each era gave rise to its own notions of fairness and rele-
vant subgroups, with overlapping ideas that are similar or identical.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the fascination with determining fairness ul-
timately died out as the work became less tied to the practical needs
of society, politics and the law, and more tied to unambiguously
identifying fairness.
We conclude by reflecting on what further lessons the history
of test fairness may have for the future of ML fairness. Careful
attention should be paid to legal and public concerns about fair-
ness. The experiences of the test fairness field suggest that in the
coming years, courts may start ruling on the fairness of ML models.
If technical definitions of fairness stray too far from the public’s
perceptions of fairness, then the political will to use scientific con-
tributions in advance of public policy may be difficult to obtain.
Perhaps ML practitioners should cautiously take heed from Cole
and Zieky’s [15] portrayal of developments in their field:
Members of the public continue to see apparently inap-
propriate interpretations of test scores and misuses of
test results. They see this area as a primary fairness con-
cern. However, the measurement profession has strug-
gled to understand the nature of its responsibility in this
area, and has generally not acted strongly against in-
stances of misuse, nor has it acted in concert to attack
misuses.
We welcome broader debate on fairness that includes both tech-
nical and cultural causes, how the context and use of ML models
further influence potential unfairness, and the suitability of the vari-
ables used in fairness research for capturing systemic unfairness.
We agree with Linn’s [44] argument from 1976 that values encoded
by technical definitions should be made explicit. By concretely re-
lating fairness debates to ethical theories and value systems (as
done by [34, 71]), we can make discussions more accessible to the
general public and to researchers of other disciplines, as well as
helping our own ML Fairness community to be more attuned to
our own implicit cultural biases.
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF
TEST FAIRNESS
This appendix provides some details of fairness definitions included
in Table 2 that were not introduced in the text of Section 2.
Einhorn and Bass
In 1971, Einhorn and Bass [24] noted that even if Cleary’s criterion
is satisfied, different rates of false positives and false negatives may
be achieved for different subgroups due to differences in standard
errors of estimate for the two subgroups. That is, differences in
variability around the common line of regression leads to different
false positive and false negative rates. To address this, they propose
a criterion based on achieving equal false discovery rate, or as
they put it, “designated risk”, at the decision boundary. That is,
Prob(Y > y ∗ |R = ra∗,A = a) is constant for all subgroups a.
Darlington’s “culturally optimum”
Darlington [19] proposes that the subjective value that one places
on test validity (related to accuracy) and diversity can be scenario-
specific. He proposes a technique for eliciting these value judge-
ments, leading to a variable k which measures the amount of trade-
off in validity that is acceptable to increase diversity. He proposes
that the “culturally optimum” test is one that maximizes ρX (Y−kC).
Jones
In 1973, Jones [37] proposed a “general standard” of fairness that
is related to Thorndike’s (and hence also related quota-based def-
initions of fairness). In Jones’ criterion, candidates are ranked in
descending order both by test score and by ground truth. If an
equal proportion of candidates from the subgroup are present in
the top n% of both ranked lists then the test is fair “at position n”.
Jones’ “general standard” of fairness requires that this hold for all
values of n. Jones assumes a regression model relating test scores
to ground truth, and also defines a weaker “mean-fair” criterion
for a subgroup that “the group’s average predicted score equals its
average performance score on the [ground truth].”
